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[E]liminating affirmative action would reduce acceptance rates
for African American and Hispanic applicants by as much as
one-half to two-thirds and have an equivalent impact on the
proportion of underrepresented minority students in the ad-
mitted class. White applicants would benefit very little by
removing racial and ethnic preferences; the White acceptance
rate would increase by roughly 0.5 percentage points. Asian
applicants would gain the most. They would occupy four out
of every five seats created by accepting fewer African American
and Hispanic students.
-Thomas Espenshade & Chang Chung,
in Social Science Quarterly (2005)1
At some elite colleges and universities, Asian Pacific American (APA)
applicants have a lesser chance of being admitted than equally qualified
White applicants. This practice, termed "negative action" is distinct from
affirmative action policies that give a plus factor to some African American,
Latino, and American Indian applicants. 2 In this critique of Espenshade and
* Senior Policy Analyst, University of California, Davis;J.D., UC Berkeley School of
Law (Boalt Hall). The views expressed in this Essay are solely those of the author, and not
necessarily those of the UC Davis administration. I thank the following scholars for their
helpful reviews of this Essay: Jack Chin, Richard Delgado, Bill Hing, Evelyn Hu-DeHart,
Helen Hyun, Jerry Kang, David Oppenheimer, Anita Poon, and John Torok. I also thank
Amrita Mallik of the Michigan Journal of Race & Law for her helpful editorial suggestions.
1. Thomas J. Espenshade & Chang Y Chung, The Opportunity Cost of Admission
Preferences at Elite Universities, 86 Soc. Sci Q. 293, 303-04 (2005). Much of their method-
ology is described in a companion study, Thomas J. Espenshade et al., Admission Preferences
for Minority Students, Athletes, and Legacies at Elite Universities, 85 Soc. Sci Q. 1422 (2004).
2. In short, negative action occurs when a "minus factor" is applied to APA candi-
dates relative to White candidates, a practice that is separate and apart from any affirmative
action "plus factor" given to African Americans and Latinos in the admissions process. See
Kang, infra note 22 and accompanying text.
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Chung's study, I show that ignoring the distinction between negative action
against APAs and affirmative action for underrepresented minorities leads to
the false conclusion that APAs would be the overwhelming beneficiaries of
ending affirmative action. In fact, at the institutions in the study, ending
negative action would result in far greater admission opportunities for APAs
than would ending affirmative action.
I conclude that Espenshade and Chung's inattention to the distinction
between negative action and affirmative action effectively marginalizes
APAs and contributes to a skewed and divisive public discourse about af-
firmative action, one in which APAs are falsely portrayed as conspicuous
adversaries of diversity in higher education. I will also argue that there is
ample reason to be concerned about the harmful effects of divisive and
empirically unsupported claims about APAs influencing the public debate
over affirmative action, particularly in Michigan, where an anti-affirmative
action initiative nearly identical to California's Proposition 209 will appear
on the November 2006 ballot. 3 For example, in commenting to the press
about Espenshade and Chung's study, Roger Clegg of the Center for Equal
Opportunity-a leading advocacy group working to dismantle affirmative
action4--cast the issue in starkly (and falsely) divisive terms: "If eliminating
race-based admissions results in more Asian students or fewer African
American students being admitted to top schools, so be it."'
INTRODUCTION
Several years ago I wrote an article attempting to situate APAs in the
debate over law school affirmative action; much of the article refuted claims
by conservative historian Stephan Thernstrom that at law schools in the
University of California (UC) system, APAs were the primary beneficiaries
of Proposition 209 and the UC Regents' resolution banning affirmative
3. See e.g., Gov. Jennifer Granholm, Affirmative Action Ban Would Hurt State's
Future, DETROIT FREE PRESS, March 9, 2006, available at http://www.freep.com/
apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060309/OPINIONO2/603090484/1070/OPINION;
Michigan Civil Rights Initiative v. State Bd. of Canvassers, 268 Mich. App. 506 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2005) (quoting MCRI language and describing unsuccessful challenge alleging
fraudulent signature gathering by MCRI campaign);John Flesher, Public Closely Divided on
Affirmative Action, Definition of Life, ASSOCIATED PRESS, March 9, 2006 (first poll in using
actual language that will appear on the Michigan ballot reports 47% opposed, 45% in fa-
vor) available at http://www.mlive.com/newsflash/regional/index.ss?/base/politics-0/
1141951161116280.xml&storylist=newsmichigan#continue.
4. See Roger Clegg, UnKingly Statutes, NAT'L REv. ONLINE, Jan. 16, 2006, http://
www.nationalreview.com/ (arguing that the Michigan anti-affirmative action "measure
will pass, but its needed not just in Michigan, but all over the nation."); Brief of the Center
for Equal Opportunity et al. in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger (Jan. 2003), available
at http://wvw.umich.edu/-urel/admissions/legal/gru-anicus-ussc/ceo-both.pdf.
5. Kelly Heyboer, Colorblindness Could Transform US. Colleges, NEW ORLEANS
TIMES-PIcAYUNE,June 12, 2005, at 10.
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action.6 Here, using Espenshade and Chung's study as a example, I make the
complementary point that supporters of affirmative action can make simi-
larly unfounded arguments that marginalize APAs. Such marginalization of
APAs comes at a steep political price, as exaggerated claims about the bene-
fits for APAs of ending affirmative action foster a divisive public discourse
in which APAs are falsely portrayed as natural adversaries of affirmative ac-
tion and the interests of African Americans and Latinos in particular.
7
The above quoted article by a Princeton University sociologist and
researcher, a study using the rich National Study of College Experience
(NSCE) dataset and funded by the Andrew W Mellon Foundation, is an
example of the robust social science on higher education admissions that
has emerged in the build-up to and the aftermath of the Supreme Court
rulings in the Michigan affirmative action cases. Espenshade and Chung's
article, The Opportunity Cost of Admission Preferences at Elite Universities,9 is
slated to become part of a book and received a fair amount of press cover-
age.'0 Yet, as I demonstrate in this Essay, access to data and the use of advanced
statistical methods hardly assure sound policy analysis with respect to APAs.
6. William C. Kidder, Situating APAs in the Law School Affirmative Action Debate:
Empirical Facts About Thernstrom's Rhetorical Acts, 7 AsiAN L.J. 29, 30-31, 34-45 (2000). As I
note infra note 30 and accompanying text, using the umbrella term "APA" for purposes of
this Essay is not intended to lend credence to the "model minority" myth that erases im-
portant differences between Asian American groups. See, e.g., Mari Matsuda, We Will Not
Be Used, 1 AsIAN PAc. Am. L.J. 79, 80 (1993); Pat K. Chew, Asian Americans: The "Reticent"
Minority and Their Paradoxes, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 25-28 (1994);Annette B. Almazan,
Looking at Diversity and Affirmative Action Through the Lens of Pilipinola American Students'
Experience at UCLA and Berkeley, 9 AsIA, PAc. AM. L.J. 44 (2004).
7. Gabriel J. Chin et al., Beyond Self-Interest:Asian Pacific Americans Toward a Commu-
nity of Justice, A Policy Analysis of Affirmative Action, 4 AsIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 129, 151 (1996)
("Whatever else APAs decide about affirmative action, we should not allow ourselves to be
used to attack other people of color. Pitting racial minority groups against one another
represents the worst form of divide-and-conquer political strategy.") One example in
which I became personally involved is that prior to working for UC Davis, I collaborated
with several APA civil rights groups and individuals in challenging an unwarranted claim
by one of the UC Regents that UC Berkeley was discriminating against APAs in favor of
African Americans and Latinos. See William C. Kidder et al., In California, A Misguided
Battle Over Race, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 21, 2004, at B16; Goodwin Liu et al., Re-
gent's Stand on UC Admissions is on Shaky Ground, SACRAMENTo BEE, April 1, 2004, at B7;
Eleanor Yang, UC Regent's Discrimination Stance Stirs Ire--Asian Americans Say Moores'
Comments are Irresponsible, SAN DinGo UNION-TRIB., April 7,2004, at A3.
8. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
9. Espenshade and Chung's APA cost-benefit analysis is restricted to the question
of who would gain or lose admission offers assuming a fixed number of seats. In the Con-
clusion, I review some of the important considerations for APAs outside of this zero-sum
admissions framework.
10. See, e.g., Eric Hoover, What Would Ending Affirmative Action Do?, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC.,June 17, 2005, at A28; Heyboer, supra note 5, at 10; Rosalinda Dejesus-Staples, Af-
firmative Action: By Any Means Necessary?, Hisp. OUTLOOK IN HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 26, 2005, at
23; Scott Jaschik, Demographic Dislocation, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC., June 7, 2005, available at
http://insidehighered.com/news/2005/06/07/affirm; Donald MacLeod, Research Shows
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In particular, Espenshade and Chung make the following claim
about APAs being the "biggest winners" without affirmative action: "They
would occupy four out of every five seats created by accepting fewer Afri-
can American and Hispanic students."'" In fact, I will show that this
conclusion does not (indeed, cannot) follow from their evidence. It is
clear from Espenshade and Chung's article and press release that they are
sympathetic to affirmative action policies and believe they are contribut-
ing to the debate by documenting how the end of affirmative action at
highly selective colleges would have a devastating effect on African
American and Latino admissions while having only a very small effect on
White admission rates. They positioned their study as refuting a key claim
of the White plaintiffs represented by the Center for Individual Rights
(CIR) in the 2003 Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger affirmative ac-
tion rulings.' 2 To be sure, I certainly agree with Espenshade and Chung
that in both policy and legal contexts, it is important to empirically
document the extent to which ending affirmative action would close
doors to many African Americans and Latinos (though that will not be
the focus of this Essay) 3
However, while the individual plaintiffs in Grutter and Gratz were all
White, their counsel at CIR successfully obtained class action status with
APAs included among individuals alleged to have suffered racial discrimi-
nation. '4 Thus, with respect to APAs, Espenshade and Chung's empirical
argument is actually quite consistent with CIR's argument before the Su-
preme Court that affirmative action harms not only Whites but
"especially Asian Americans." In part, it was the troubling prospect of
CIR purporting to carry the mantle of civil rights on behalf of APAs in
the Michigan cases that led the intervenors to call professor Frank Wu to
Benefits of Affirmative Action, TnE GutDiA,, June 7, 2005, available at http://education.
guardian.co.uk/higher/worldwide/story/0,9959,1501216,00.html?gusrc=rss.
11. Espenshade & Chung, supra note 1, at 298,304.
12. Princeton University Press Release, Ending affirmative action would devastate most
minority college enrollnent-Study finds virtually no gain for White students (June 6, 2005), avail-
able at http://www.princeton.edu/main/news/archive/S11/80/78Q19/index.xml?section
=newsreleases. Irrespective of the legal filings by CIR in the Michigan cases, the notion
that affirmative action substantially harms White applicants is empirically questionable, but
nonetheless a stubbornly persistent theme in the public discourse on affirmative action.
Goodwin Liu calls this popular misperception the "causation fallacy." Liu, infra note 33 and
accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., David L. Chambers et al., The Real Impact of Ending Affirmative Action in
American Law Schools:An Empirical Critique of Richard Sander's Study, 57 STAN. L. RFv. 1855
(2005);William C. Kidder, The Struggle for Access from Sweatt to Grutter:A History of African
American, Latino, and Native American Law School Admissions, 1950-2000, 19 Htav. BLACK-
L=TRE LJ. 1 (2003).
14. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 317; Gratz, 539. U.S. at 252.
15. Petitioner's Supreme Court Brief in Grutter v. Bollinger 39 (Jan. 16, 2003), avail-
able at http://www.umich.edu/-urel/admissions/legal/grutter/grupet-supct.pdf.
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testify as an expert in the Grutter trial, as well as prompting the National
Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium and 27 other public interest
and civil rights organizations in the APA community to file a brief de-
fending the benefits of affirmative action generally and for APAs
specifically.17 The public comments of the National Association of Schol-
ars18 and the Center for Equal Opportunity 9 in response to Espensade and
Chung's study provide additional confirmation of this overlap between
Espenshade and Chung's conclusion and conservatives' narrative of APAs
as victims of affirmative action. 20
Michael Omi and Dana Takagi have astutely observed that in the
public debate over affirmative action, the position of APAs is much more
fluid than that of other racial/ethnic groups, a fluidity that "can be mampu-
lated in particular ways to suit particular positions. 21 This fluidity is evident
when Espenshade and Chung at times blur two conceptually distinct issues:
(1) affirmative action consideration for African Americans and Latinos in
the admissions process; and (2) the lower admission rates of APAs compared
to Whites with similar credentials-what Jerry Kang calls "negative action"
Kang defines negative action as "unfavorable treatment based on
race, using the treatment ofWhites as a basis for comparison. In functional
terms, negative action against Asian Americans is in force if a university
denies admission to an Asian American who would have been admitted
16. Trial Transcript in Grutter v. Bollinger (E.D. Mich. Feb. 12, 2001), available at
http://www.uniich.edu/~urel/admissions/legal/grutter/gru.trans/gru2.12.01 .html.
17. Brief of Amici Curiae National Asian Pac. Am. Legal Consortium et al. in Grut-
ter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger (Feb. 15, 2003), reprinted in 10 ASIAN L.J. 295, 295
(2003) ("Amici include Japanese, Chinese, Filipino, Korean, Hmong, South Asian, Pacific
Islander, Cambodian, Laotian, and Vietnamese American public-interest groups. Amid also
include some of the largest and oldest APA organizations in this country that are involved
in challenging racial discrimination .... ").
18. Hoover, supra note 10, at A28 (quoting Stephen Balch, president of NAS: "That
it's Asian students who bear the brunt of affirmative-action policies at elite institutions
strikes me as an interesting finding in and of itself.... One of the dirty little secrets in all
of this is that one of the chief losers is a minority group.").
19. Quoted in Heyboer, supra note 5, at 10.
20. See, e.g., Janine Young Kim, Are Asians Black?: The Asian American Civil Rihts
Agenda and the Contemporary Significance of the Black/White Paradigm, 108 YALE. L.J. 2385,
2409 (1999) ("Asian Americans play a strange and contorted role in the affirmative action
debate. Those who would eliminate affirmative action use the Asian American population
to exemplify how affirmative action disadvantages non-Whites as well as Whites.").
21. Michael Omi & Dana Y Takagi, Situating Asian Americans in the Political Discourse
on Affirmative Action, 55 REPRESENTATIONS 155, 156 (Summer 1996). See also Dana Y Ta-
kagi, From Discrimination to Affirmative Action: Facts in the Asian American Admissions
Controversy, 37 Soc. PROBs. 578, 590 (1990) ("What makes Asian admissions a particularly
interesting case to consider here is the juxtaposition of the enormous amount of quantita-
tive information and the importance of facts, on the one hand, and the ease with which
these facts are used to construct quite different interpretations of reality on the other.").
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had that person been White."" Many APA scholars in fields including law,
ethnic studies, and sociology emphasize the importance of distinguishing
between negative action and affirmative action, but it is a distinction that
is still too often overlooked by journalists and commentators24 and, as I will
show, some social scientists as well. Unlike the University of Michigan Law
School's affirmative action policy upheld in Grutter, which set a goal of at-
taining a "critical mass" of underrepresented minority students in order to
enhance the learning environment of all students, negative action policies at
elite universities can stem from less laudable goals and practices, such as an
25interest in preserving the traditional White character of an elite institution,
22. Jerry Kang, Negative Action Against Asian Americans: The Internal Instability of
Dworkin's Defense ofAffirmative Action, 31 HAv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3 (1996).
23. See, e.g., Chin et al., Beyond Self-Interest, supra note 7, at 159 ("What APAs must
understand is that negative action against us does not result from affirmative action for
other minorities."); Robert S. Chang, Reverse Racism!: Affirmative Action, the Family, and the
Dream that is America, 23 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 1115, 1127 (1996) ("Asian Americans are
pitted against Blacks and Hispanics as if there are only a certain number of seats available
for minority students. This is true only if a certain number of seats are reserved for White
students."); Takagi, From Discrimination to Affirmative Action, supra note 21, at 578-79 ("Al-
though Asian American organizations were quick to denounce the neoconservative claim
that discrimination against Asian Americans was the result of affirmative action policy,
blaming discrimination against Asian Americans on affirmative action policy seems to be a
promising venue for additional neoconservative claims.").
24. See, e.g., Jay Matthews, Should Colleges Have Quotas for Asian Americans?, WASH.
POST, Oct 12, 2004, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/
A26499-20040ct12.html; Jay Matthews, Quotas for Asian Americans? Yes and No, WASH.
POST, Jan. 25, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/
A35075-2005Jan25.html; Jacques Steinberg, The New Calculus of Diversity on Campus,
N.YTIMES, Feb. 2, 2003, at Week in Review 3; Nat Hentoff, A Secret Quota-But not All
Minorities are Created Equal, WASH. TIMES, March 17, 2003, at A17.
25. Espenshade and Chung discuss how one of the methods for better understand-
ing the empirical effects of affirmative action is to consult expert opinion, and they note
the APA negative action admissions controversy in the 1980s. Espenshade & Chung, supra
note 1, at 295; Espenshade et al., supra note 1, at 1423 n.1. In this context, it is noteworthy
that one of the "smoking gun" memos by the admissions director at a nationally renowned
public university, which someone leaked to the press in the 1980s, stated, "The campus
will endeavor to curb the decline of Caucasian students.... A rising concern will come
from Asian students." Grace W Tsuang, Assuring Equal Access of Asian Americans to Highly
Selective Universities, 98 YALE L.J. 659, 675-76 n.117 (1989). See also Matsuda, supra note 6,
at 81 ("When university administrators have secret quotas to keep down Asian admissions,
this is because Asians are seen as destroying the predominantly white character of the uni-
versity."). Concern with the relationship between White enrollment levels and institutional
sensibility is arguably a larger issue at the most elite private universities, where exclusion-
ary policies toward many groups, including Jews, immigrants, African Americans, and
women, have deeper roots. See, e.g., JEROME KARABEL, THE CHOSEN: THE HIDDEN HISTORy
OF ADMISSION AND EXCLUSION AT HtavAisn, YALE, AND PRINCETON (2005). In terms of
Espenshade and Chung's study of the 1997 admission cycle at three elite universities,
Karabel reports that public scrutiny and the Office for Civil Rights investigation in the
late-1980s led to a closing of the gap in APA-White admission rates at Harvard and
Princeton, but the gap widened again in the years since 1990. Id. at 503,510, 531. See also
[VoL. 11:605
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or unwitting stereotyping of APA applicants in the admissions
26
process.
I. UNRAVELING THE "YELLOW PERIL CAUSATION FALLACY"
Using a database of 45,500 freshmen applications to the 1997 enter-
ing class at three of the most selective research universities in America,
Espenshade and Chung set out to answer this key research question:"First,
what is the impact of affirmative action on the profile of students admit-
ted to elite universities? In other words, who gains and who loses as a
result of admission preferences for underrepresented minority students?
' 27
Espenshade and Chung test this research question by employing a logistic
regression model to predict a probability of admission 28 , first confirming
that their simulation was in close agreement with the actual admission
I 29Th uhr hnoeainldecisions made at the three institutions. The authors then operational-
ized their research question by "setting all regression coefficients on racial
background to zero or, equivalently, by assuming that all applicants are
white (the reference category)., 30 Espenshade and Chung's logistic regres-
sion model included the following predictor variables: sex, citizenship
status, SAT scores, race/ethnicity, recruited athlete status and legacy status
(i.e., a plus factor for relatives of alumni).31 They ran other simulations in
which athlete and legacy coefficients were set to zero, but being a re-
cruited athlete or a legacy had a smaller net effect on the racial/ethnic
DANA Y. TAKAGI, THE RETREAT FROM RACE: ASIAN AMERICAN ADMISSIONS AND IRACIAL
POLITICS (1992) (reviewing allegations of negative action at Brown, Stanford, Princeton,
and other universities in the 1980s).
26. Cf Chin v. Runnels, 343 F Supp. 2d 891, 905-08 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (discussing
social science on stereotyping of APAs in the context of zero Chinese Americans, Filipino
Americans and Latinos being selected as jury forepersons in San Francisco Superior Court
over a 36-year span); KARABEL, supra note 25, at 503-05 (discussing allegations that Harvard
engaged in subtle, non-intentional discrimination in the 1980s); Tsuang, supra note 25, at
663-65 (discussing questionable stereotypes about APA applicants at elite schools).
27. Espenshade & Chung, supra note 1, at 294.
28. The authors started with models that are additive (in the logistic scale) and then
investigated interaction terms. See Espenshade et al., supra note 1, at 1427-32.
29. Espenshade & Chung, supra note 1, at 296. In particular, the authors found that
for the 45,549 applicants included in their Table 1 data, the actual probability of admission
and the simulated probability of admission were identical (0.219280). Id. at 297 n.4.
30. Id. at 296.
31. Id. The authors did not have information on extracurricular activities, personal
statements, and letters of recommendation; factors they concede "surely play a role in deter-
mining which applicants to accept." Espenshade et al., supra note 1, at 1427 n.6. On the other
hand, the fact that for APAs there is a difference of several hundred admission offers between
a simple rank ordering of applicants by SAT scores versus Espenshade and Chung's race-
neutral simulations suggests that, to some extent, they are indirectly capturing the way in
which other factors in the admissions process influence the racial/ethnic distribution of ad-
mission offers. Cf Espenshade & Chung, supra note 1, at 297 tbl.1, 301 n.5.
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composition of admission offers because these two categories only applied
to a small subset of the applicant pool.32
Goodwin Liu has written extensively about the "causation fallacy"
underlying the affirmative action debate; i.e., the empirically unrealistic
presumption on the part of many Whites denied admission at selective
institutions that they surely would have been admitted but for affirmative
action.33 Given that Espenshade and Chung comment specifically on that
phenomenon, 34 it is more than a little surprising that they fall prey to
what might be called a "yellow peril causation fallacy 3 5-the dramatically
overstated claim that if affirmative action ended, APAs would be poised to
grab four out of every five seats resulting from the exclusion of African
Americans and Latinos.
Chart 1 displays Espenshade and Chung's key findings. Looking at
the third set of bars in Chart 1 (the difference for each racial/ethnic
group) helps provide an intuitive sense of how Espenshade and Chung
arrived at a demonstrably false conclusion. There were 984 fewer admis-
sion offers to Blacks/Latinos and 952 more admission offers to
Whites/APAs/others. Since 772 of the 952 offers under the "race-
neutral" simulation went to APAs, Espenshade and Chung conclude that
(Wow!) four out of five (81%) admission offers taken away from African
Americans and Latinos were redistributed to APAs. 36 Similarly, they con-
32. Id. The authors found, at least for the three elite institutions in their study, that
"preferences for legacies and athletes do little to displace minority applicants .... Id. at
304. See also id. at 299 tbl.2 (comparing Simulations 1,2 and 3).
33. Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of Selective
Admissions, 100 MICH. L. REv. 1045, 1046 (2002).
34. Espenshade & Chung, supra note 1, at 298 ("Many rejected White applicants
may feel they would have been accepted had it not been for affirmative action, but such
perceptions probably exaggerate the reality.").
35. See Keith Aoki, "Foreign-ness" & Asian American Identities: Yellowface, World War II
Propaganda & Bifurcated Racial Stereotypes, 4 AsIAN PAC. AM. UJ. 1, 16 (1996) ("With only a
slight shift of emphasis, the 'yellow peril' becomes the 'model minority' or vice versa.");
Natsu Taylor Saito, Model Minority, Yellow Peril: Functions of "Foreignness" in the Construction of
Asian American Legal Identity, 4 AsiAN L.J. 71, 71-72 (1997). Saito writes:
Those of Asian descent are sometimes portrayed as the "model minority,"
people who are succeeding in America despite their status as minorities by
working and studying, saving and sacrificing for the future. However, as the
"yellow peril," Asians and Asian Americans are also depicted as ... unfair
competitors for education and jobs.
Id.
36. If one could disaggregate APAs in Espenshade and Chung's dataset, considerable
differences in admission rates between subgroups would be expected because of differ-
ences between APA ethnic groups with respect to socioeconomic status, immigration
history, parental education level, labor market opportunities, and so on. My current institu-
tion (UC Davis) is not quite as highly selective as the colleges in Espenshade and Chung's
dataset, but it provides an instructive example. See UC Davis Office of Student Affairs Fact
Sheet, Diversity Among Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders at UC Davis, (Aug. 2005). Over-
[VOL. 11:605
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clude that since Whites only had a net gain of 122 admission offers (from
a starting point of 5,134), ending affirmative action would have only a
minimal effect on admission offers to Whites (Wow again!).3 1 While
Espenshade and Chung did not control for every variable that an admis-
sions office might take into account (e.g., a plus factor for students from
rural backgrounds),3 s the fact that 2,369 APAs were actually admitted
compared to 3,141 under their "race-neutral" simulation (an increase of
nearly one-third) is a sufficiently large difference to suggest that APAs are
in fact being penalized in the admissions process at some of America's top
private universities. The question I pose in the next section is whether the
primary cause is in fact negative action against APAs or affirmative action
for African Americans and Latinos.
all, for the 1998 entering class (admitted under Proposition 209), the six-year graduation
rate for APAs was 80.7% (n = 1318), nearly the same as the 81.4% rate for Whites (n =
1395). At the same time, the differences in graduation rates between some APA ethnic
groups (e.g., Chinese Americans compared to Vietnamese or Korean Americans) were
greater than the difference between African Americans (74.7%, n = 95, 1040 SAT average)
and Whites (1200 SAT average).
UC DAVIS SIX-YEAR GRADUATION RATES: FALL 1998 FRESHMEN CLASS
Group (No.) SATAvg. Graduation Rate Group (No.) SATAvg. Graduation Rate
Chinese (567) 1137 87.7% Korean (100) 1177 66.0%
E. Indian/
Pakistani (79) 1165 78.5% Other Asian (78) 1045 70.5%
Pacific Islander'
Filipino(151) 1099 82.1% (74) 1158 78.4%
Japanese (75) 1187 82.7% 1 Vietnamese (194) 1060 71.7%
Anecdotal evidence from UC Davis staff suggests that at least for the 1998 class,
"Pacific Islander" may include some students who trace their national origins to Taiwan
(and misunderstood that this category refers to those with ancestors native to Hawai'i,
Guam, Samoa, etc.), a pattern consistent with the graduation and SAT figures. SAT scores
are provided simply to give some sense of these students' varied academic profiles; SAT
scores are a weak predictor of individual-level graduation rates at UC Davis.
37. See Press Release, Princeton Univ., supra note 12; Espenshade & Chung, supra
note 1, at 298,304.
38. This point is discussed in greater detail infra note 60.
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CHART I:
ADMISSION OFFERS WITH AND WITHOUT RACE AS A
FACTOR AT 3 ELITE UNIVERSITIES (I997)"9
Racial/Ethnic Composition ofAdmission Offers in
Espenshade & Chung Table 2 (p. 299)
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The problem is that Espenshade and Chung's study is internally
contradictory: their research design confounds the role of negative action
against APAs with the role of affirmative action for African Americans and
Latinos, yet the research question they posed was about the "impact of
affirmative action" and their conclusion that APAs "would gain the most"
appears to attribute causation to affirmative action per se (or at the very least,
Espenshade and Chung's blurry conclusion will mislead many reasonable
readers into believing that a strong causal claim about affirmative action
has been made).40 Such a conclusion about affirmative action is untenable
39. Chart 1 provides information from Espenshade & Chung, supra note 1, at 299
tbl.2, comparing actual admission results with their Simulation 1, which equalized all ra-
cial/ethnic coefficients but left intact legacy and athletics-related admission factors. The
total number of admits in reality (n = 9,988) is negligibly different from the number in
Simulation 1 (n = 9,956). Simulation 3 also eliminated legacy/athlete admissions, but since
Espenshade and Chung's claims relate directly to affirmative action and not to the dispa-
rate impact of other factors, Simulation 1 was more appropriate for evaluating their claims.
Based on legacy application patterns, the "other" category appears to include some Whites
who declined to state their ethnicity. Espenshade et al., supra note 1, at 1426.
40. Espenshade and Chung are not unaware of the distinction between affirmative
action and negative action, Espenshade & Chung, supra note 1, at 301. However, they treat
this distinction too casually. In their companion study, Espenshade, Chung, and Walling
define affirmative action as "preferences extended to underrepresented minority groups-
principally students ofAfrican or Hispanic, but not Asian, heritage." Espenshade et al., supra
note 1, at 1423 n.1. Espenshade and Chung then contradict their own definition by fold-
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unless the role of negative action is truly de minimus,4' but Espenshade and
Chung conservatively estimate that the penalty APAs confront because of
negative action typically translates to about 50 points on the SAT.42 More-
over, given that there were 5,134 Whites in the admit pool, compared to
1,691 African Americans and Latinos, it follows from this three-to-one ratio
that Whites must be the primary beneficiaries of negative action against
APAs. By implication, ending negative action would primarily involve a
transfer of admission offers from Whites back to APAs; inevitably, the num-
ber of African American and Latino admission offers that would be at play
with the end of negative action is substantially smaller.
In addition to sheer numbers, the distribution of likely admits in
Espenshade and Chung's study also suggests that their conclusion -that
absent affirmative action APAs would acquire four out of five seats taken
away from Blacks and Latinos-is, to put it mildly, swimming upstream in
relation to their data: 80.8% of actual admits and 84.5% of Simulation 1
admits had SAT scores in the 1300-1600 range (56.9% and 61.1% were
1400-1600 range), and the authors note that if they ranked the top 9,988
applicants by SAT scores (enough to equal admission offers), only 3.1% of
that pool is African American or Latino whereas 86.4% is White or APA.43
Espenshade et al.'s companion study of the same elite universities found,
"The largest admission preferences are conferred on applicants who have
SAT scores above 1400 ... *,44
The upshot of the fact that White admitees outnumber
Blacks/Latinos 3-to-1, and the aforementioned discussion about the
composition of actual and likely pool of admitees is that Espenshade and
Chung's study contains a "yellow peril causation fallacy" that misidentifies
APAs as the group poised to be the biggest numerical winners if affirma-
tive action ended at elite universities. In other words, when an APA
applicant in their dataset is denied admission because of negative action
despite a strong transcript and say a 1510 or 1430 or 1360 on the SAT, it
ing negative action into their conclusions about affirmative action. Cf Frank H. Wu, Nei-
ther Black nor White: Asian Americans and Affirmative Action, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 225,
250 (1995) ("In affirmative action cases, Asian Americans.. are relegated to the status of
footnotes.").
41. In statistical parlance, the problem with Espenshade and Chung's causal explana-
tion about affirmative action is an example of "Simpson's paradox" Paul W Holland, The
False Linking of Race and Causality: Lessons From Standardized Testing, 4 RACE & Soc'y 219,
220 (2001) (summarizing Simpson's paradox and giving the example of a claim of sex
discrimination in UC Berkeley graduate admissions as being unsubstantiated due to a
confounding variable). APA critical legal scholars agree that the causal role of negative
action should not be confused with that of affirmative action. See articles quoted infra
notes 22-23.
42. Espenshade & Chung, supra note 1, at 293-94; Espenshade et al., supra note 1, at
1433, 1444.
43. Espenshade & Chung, supra note 1, at 297 tbl.1, 301 n.5.
44. Espenshade et al., supra note 1, at 1431.
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is exceedingly more likely that the student admitted instead was a White
applicant with slightly lower academic credentials, not a Black or Latino
applicant given an affirmative action plus factor. This pattern is obscured
when the distinction between negative action and affirmative action is
ignored, so in Chart 2 I attempt to bring the issue into sharper focus.
Chart 2 provides ballpark estimates of what the results would look
like if Espenshade and Chung had separately estimated the effects of ending
negative action and affirmative action (I say "ballpark" because the dataset is
not yet publicly available). The "combined effect" bars in Chart 2 are the
same as the "difference" bars in Chart 1. The lion's share of APAs' gains in
admission offers stem from the abatement of negative action. Consequently,
Whites, not APAs, would occupy the largest number of the seats created by
ending affirmative action at the elite universities in question. Espenshade
and Chung's contrary suggestion defies basic arithmetic.
Thus, even from the confined vantage point of self-interested APAs
(and in the Conclusion I discuss considerations that go beyond educa-
tional self-interest), the logical focus of criticism and activism at elite
private universities should be on ending negative action, since that would
yield a much higher payoff in terms of increasing educational opportuni-
ties than would focusing criticism on affirmative action policies.
Negative Action Versus Affirmative Action
CHART 2"
Ballpark Estimates of the Impact of Ending Negative Action Versus
Ending Affirmative Action by Race/Ethnicity in
Espenshade & Chung Table 2 (p. 299)
U No Negative Action 0 No Affirmative Action E Combined Effect
White Black Latin¢ Asian Pac. Am. Other
II. LAW SCHOOL REALITY CHECK:
How APAs FARED BEFORE AND AFTER
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BANs
To confirm their results, Espenshade and Chung review data from the
"natural experiment" of affirmative action bans in California and Washington,
including the law schools at UC Berkeley (Boalt Hall), UCLA, and UC
Davis.46 The UC law school data are consistent with Espenshade and Chung's
findings with respect to Blacks and Latinos.Yet, rather than simply concluding
that "our simulation results are in very good agreement with the California
experience 4 1 the data should have alerted Espenshade and Chung that their
conclusion-that ending affirmative action results in marginal gains for
Whites and substantial gains for APAs-turns reality on its head.
45. Exact values are intentionally not displayed so as to avoid giving a false sense of
precision. In writing this Essay I did not have access to the NSCE dataset.The NSCE data
is not currently available for public use, though my correspondence with Espenshade indi-
cates that it may become publicly available at some later date after publication of the book
that he and his colleagues are drafting. The main point of Chart 2-showing that Espen-
shade and Chung's estimate of APAs receiving 772 additional admission offers is more a
function of ending negative action than ending affirmative action-is, I believe, incontro-
vertible.
46. Espenshade & Chung, supra note 1, at 302-03,303 n.6.
47. Id. at 303.
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Table 1 displays pre and post-affirmative action enrollment percent-
ages for APAs at five highly selective law schools between 1993 and 2005:
UCLA, UC Berkeley, UC Davis, University of Washington, and the Uni-
versity ofTexas. I am unaware of any credible evidence indicating that these
public law schools practiced negative action against APAs in 1993-96, prior
to affirmative action bans. Note then the marked contrast between the real
data and the "yellow peril" prediction made by Espenshade and Chung.
APA enrollments actually declined at UCLA (from 19.4% to 18.1%) and at
Washington (from 17.8% to 15.2%). APA enrollments increased somewhat
at Boalt Hall (from 15.5% to 17.9%) and UC Davis (from 17.1% to 20.6%)
and increased marginally at University of Texas (from 5.7% to 6.3%). Across
the five schools, APAs were 12.9% of the student body with affirmative ac-
tion and 14.3% without affirmative action.
TABLE 1
4
APA ENROLLMENT PERCENTAGES AT SELECTIVE PUBLIC LAW SCHOOLS
WITH AND t AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, 1993-2005
UCB3 U. of
UCLA (Boalt) UC Davis Washington U. of Texas
1993 18.5% 18.5% 19.4% 20.9% 4.6%
1994 20.9% 14.9% 15.7% 24.1% 5.7%
1995 22.8% 13.5% 19.1% 11.2% 6.2%
1996 15.6% 17.5% 14.5% 13.4% . 5.8%
1997 215, 1.,- 1.0-17.5% 8
1998 17 , 78, 64- 19.7%
1999 Average (all 5a
2000 17.1- 1.1 202,1 5ot
2001 Am Ao 129 o 14T 16, 3'-
2002 1111.1 05 20 _-
2003133, Z0,6 29- i15 8"
2004 9'1C 2
2005 a b at http //wwc, e ni o65%
Average With & 1the Amsin Offce .7Without
Affirmative Action Tb 12 o the 1 at ln v
Cumulative Average (all 5) Aeji
With Affirmative Action: 12.9%
48. See Univ. of Cal. Offce of the President, University of California's Law Schools
(Oct. 2005), available at http://www.ucop.edu/acadadv/datamgmt/lawmed/; Univ. of
Washington School of Law, Applicant and Enrollment Statistics for Minority Students
(unpublished memorandum provided by the Admissions Offce); Univ. of Texas Offce of
Institutional Research, Table 12 of the 1995-96 and 2005-06 Statistical Handbook, available
at http://www.utexas.edu/academic/oir (I excluded foreign students from the totals to
maintain consistency with the other law schools in Table 1). For APAs, N = 840 with
affirmative action and N = 1720 without affirmative action.
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Given that this data spans over a dozen years, one might expect
some increase in APA enrollments due to larger demographic trends in
higher education rather than the role of affirmative action bans. At a na-
tional level, in 1993 APAs were 5.50% of applicants (and 5.47% of
enrollments) at ABA-accredited law schools, whereas in 2005 APAs were
8.29% of applicants (and 8.21% of enrollments) at ABA schools.49 Thus,
the proportion of APAs in the applicant pool and first-year class at ABA
law schools increased by 50% between 1993 and 2005 with the vast ma-
jority of American law schools practicing affirmative action to some
extent during this entire period. In California (an interesting test case be-
cause it is the state with the highest proportion ofAPAs in the continental
U.S.), ° APAs' proportion of the applicant pool at UC law schools had
already been gradually increasing prior to the ban on affirmative action,
and it kept increasing at the same rate after the ban, so it is not surprising
that there was some increase in UC enrollment percentages, as that would
most likely have occurred with or without Proposition 209.1 Likewise,
with affirmative action in place, APA enrollments at Texas increased from
1% in 1986-89 to 5.5% in 1993-96, so APAs' additional gains under
Hopwood s2 (to 6.3% in 1997-2004) pale by comparison. In summary, for
APAs the cumulative effect of affirmative action bans at the UC, UW, and
UT law schools appears to be more or less a wash. 3
49. Law School Admission Council, 1992-93 National Decision Profiles (Jan.
1994); Law School Admission Council, National Decision Profiles for Fall 2005 (Jan.
2006), unpublished memoranda available from the LSAC Data Management Department.
Whites' share of the national applicant pool at ABA law schools dropped from 73.2% in
1993 to 65.3% in 2005. Id.
50. JESSICA S. BARNES & CLAUDETTE E. BENNETT, THE AsiAN POPULATION: 2000 5,
tbl.2 (Feb. 2002), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/c2kbrO1-16.pdf.
51. The available combined data for Boalt, UCLA, and Davis only went back to
1993, but given this limitation, APAs' proportion of the UC Law School applicant pool
increased from 18.8% in 1993 to 20.8% in 1996 (the last year with affirmative action), an
increase of 11%. Between 1997 and 2000 (an equal time interval) APA application propor-
tions increased 9%, and they also increased by 11% between 2001 and 2004. See Univ. of
Cal. Office of the President, supra note 48.
52. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), superseded, Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
53. Espenshade and Chung correctly note that higher education admissions is a
dynamic rather than static system, with students responding to altered incentives. Espen-
shade and Chung, supra note 1, at 294-95 n.1. It is therefore noteworthy that at the five
highly selective law schools in Table 1, the rate of APAs' enrollment increases lagged be-
hind the rate at which APA applications and enrollments increased nationally at ABA
schools. This suggests that APA law school candidates did not, on balance, redirect their
interest toward law schools subject to affirmative action bans, for whatever reason (e.g.,
there were not significant opportunity-maximizing benefits to be had; such benefits were
perceived to be offset by other factors such as the benefits of learning in a racially diverse
class, attractiveness of financial aid packages, etc.). This contrasts somewhat with Long's
finding that APA high school seniors increased applications to selective universities in
California and Texas immediately after affirmative action bans took effect. Mark C. Long,
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In addition, Wightman's logistic regression model of race-blind ad-
missions at the top 30 U.S. law schools reports declines for APAs, 4 and
Princeton demographer Marta Tienda's study of the Texas flagship public
universities found mixed results for APAs after an affirmative action ban. s
CONCLUSION:
OPPORTUNITIES LOST IN "OPPORTUNITY COST"
When a political talk show host on cable TV makes a "yellow peril"
prediction that absent affirmative action, by 2007 APAs will be 80% of the
class at the UCLA Law School, one hopes most scholars will easily dismiss
that as nonsense.5 6 However, when the recent chair of the Sociology De-
partment at Princeton suggests in a well respected peer-reviewed social
science journal that APAs "would occupy four out of every five seats" cre-
ated by ending affirmative action for African Americans and Latinos, such
a claim is taken very seriously by social scientists, policymakers, and the
press. In this case, that is unfortunate.
College Applications and the Effect ofAffirmative Action, 121 J. ECONOMETRICS 319 (2004). One
admittedly speculative partial explanation for the difference between APA college and law
school application patterns could be that APA high school students are more likely than
older, more mature APA law school candidates to succumb to the "causation fallacy," the
unrealistic belief that the end of affirmative action would greatly improve their admission
chances at schools like Berkeley, UCLA, and the University of Texas at Austin. See Liu,
supra note 33, at 1046-48.
54. Linda EWightman, The Consequences of Race-Blindness: Revisiting Prediction Models
with Current Law School Data, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 229, 247 tbl. 9 (2003) (using actual appli-
cant and admission data in the 2001 cycle, and finding that if admissions were based solely
on LSATs and UGPAs, at Tier 1 law schools APA admission offers would go down from
834 to 731, and would decrease at Tier 2 law schools from 1,693 to 1,580, though offers
to Whites would go up at Tiers 1 and 2).
55. MARTA TIENDA ET AL., CLOSING THE GAP?: ADMISSIONS & ENROLLMENTS AT THE
TEXAS PUBLIC FLAGSHIPS BEFORE AND AFTER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 17-18, 40-42 tbls.4-6
(2003), available at http://opr.princeton.edu/papers/opr0301.pdf. Comparing the four
years before and after the Hopwood v. Texas ruling banning affirmative action (1992-96
versus 1997-2000), Tienda et al. found APAs' admission prospects at Texas A&M worsened
without affirmative action, and though gains for APAs were evident at the University of
Texas at Austin, this was because the Texas Ten Percent plan and other changes appeared to
lessen negative action against APAs vis-i-vis Whites. Tienda et al.'s post-affirmative action
data merges one year without the Texas Ten Percent Plan (1997) with three years when
the Plan was in effect (1998-2000)). The data shed a different light on the claims of
Steinberg in the New York Times that APAs were the main beneficiaries of an affirmative
action ban in Texas. Steinberg, supra note 24.
56. CNN Crossfire cohost Bob Beckel, trying to make an argument for affirmative
action, asked a guest, "Would you like to see the UCLA Law School 80 percent Asian?
Because at the rate it is going ... by the year 2007 UCLA will be 80 percent Asian. Will
that make you happy?" See Stephan Thernstrom, Farewell to Preferences?, 130 PUB. INT. 34,
42-43 (1998) (quoting Beckel). Table 1, supra, indicates APAs were 16.9% of the entering
class at UCLA School of Law in 2005.
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Unlike CIR, the National Association of Scholars and similar or-
ganizations actively working to dismantle affirmative action, Espenshade
and Chung are not attempting to pit APAs against other groups as a
shrewd political strategy.17 At the end of the day, however, Espenshade and
Chung effectively marginalize APAs by treating them as a buffer group, a
kind of "middleman" in their affirmative action cost-benefit analysis be-
tween Blacks/Latinos and Whites.58 At a political level, the net result of
this marginalization, unintended though it may be, is that their study aids
and abets affirmative action opponents and skews the public debate by
improperly casting APAs as the enemies of diversityi 9
Moreover, though it is unclear if Espenshade and Chung's evidence
would be enough for an APA plaintiff to file a lawsuit 60 or spur a
57. FRANK H. WU,YELLOW: RACE IN AMERICA BEYoND BLACK AND WHITE 58 (2002)
("[Plolitical scientist Claire Kim has argued that Asian Americans are positioned through
'racial triangulation' much as a Machiavellian would engage in political triangulation for
maximum advantage.").Years ago, Michael Greve, a co-founder of CIR, candidly described
this strategy. Michael S. Greve, The Newest Move in Law Schools' Quota Game, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 5, 1992, at A12 (commenting on an early-1990s Office for Civil Rights investigation
of Boalt Hall admissions as "an opportunity to call, on behalf of a racial minority (i.e., the
Asian applicants) for an end to discrimination. It was an appeal that, when made on behalf
ofWhites, is politically hopeless and, perhaps, no longer entirely respectable.").
58. Wu, supra note 57, at 58.Wu observes:
"Asian Americans are as much a 'middleman minority' as we are a model
minority. We are placed in the awkward position of buffer or intermediary,
elevated as the preferred racial minority at the expense of denigrating Afri-
can Americans .... Sumi Cho has explained that Asian Americans are turned
into 'racial mascots' giving right-wing causes a novel messenger, camouflag-
ing arguments that would look unconscionably self-interested if made by
Whites about themselves."
Id. See also Dana Takagi, The Three Percent Solution:Asian Americans and Affirmative Action, 6
AsIAN AM. POL'Y REV. 1,6, 12 (1996) (discussing APAs' middleman status).
59. See L. Ling-chi Wang, Being Used and Being Marginalized in the Affirmative Action
Debate: Re-envisioning Multiracial America fom an Asian American Perspective, 6 ASIAN AM.
POL'Y REv. 49, 54-55 (1996) (criticizing some proponents of affirmative action for their
Black-White bipolar paradigm that marginalizes APAs from the discourse and "aids and
abets opponents of affirmative action.").
60. Tsuang, supra note 25 (analyzing data and legal arguments for scenarios in which
APAs were treated unfavorably in comparison to Whites in elite college admissions). -An
empirical caveat is that there could be factors beyond those controlled for by Espenshade
and Chung that would account for some of the negative action, such as a plus factor for
students from rural backgrounds. See, e.g., Robert Teranishi et al., Opportunity at the Cross-
roads: Racial Inequality, School Segregation, and Higher Education in California, 106 TCHRS. C.
REc., 2224, 2231 (2004) (in California, 154 of 373 White-majority high schools are in
rural locations, compared to zero of 19 APA-majority schools). Such facially neutral expla-
nations would make it more difficult for an APA plaintiff to sustain an intentional
discrimination claim under the Equal Protection Clause and Tide VI. Gratz, 539 U.S. at
275. Additionally, as Goodwin Liu notes, what matters is not the treatment of the average
applicant "but rather the treatment of the individual applicant who has chosen to become
a plaintiff." Liu, supra note 33, at 1079.
SPRINc 2006]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
Department of Education investigation, 6' Espenshade and Chung's study,
flawed though it may be in its presentation, should still prompt officials at
elite universities to critically reexamine their admissions practices. Re-
gardless of how committed these institutions are to affirmative action,
they should repudiate negative action against APAs.
Finally, to come full circle regarding the Grutter and Gratz cases and
the so-called "Michigan Civil Rights Initiative:' I should clarify why it
can be inferred from the empirical discussion in Parts I and II of this Es-
say that Espenshade and Chung's findings are particularly inapplicable to
APAs in Michigan.12 The pending anti-affirmative action ballot initiative
in Michigan would have the greatest impact in higher education admis-
sions at highly selective programs like the University of Michigan Law
School (programs comparable in selectivity to the elite private universities
in Espenshade and Chung's study).63 Yet, in Grutter, even the statistical
analysis by CIR's expert witness failed to uncover evidence of negative
action toward APAs in relation to White applicants.64 This non-finding is
61. An Office for Civil Rights investigation is mentioned because it is no longer
possible to bring a Title VI disparate impact (as opposed to intentional discrimination)
claim either directly or (at least where many elite colleges are located) to enforce Title VI
disparate impact regulations via Section 1983. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281
(2001). Cases precluding enforcement of Title VI disparate impact regulations include Save
OurValley v. Sound Transit, 335 F3d 932 (9th Cir. 2003); South Camden Citizens in Ac-
tion v. New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection, 274 F3d 771 (3rd Cir. 2001);
Harris v.James, 127 E3d 993 (11th Cir. 1997); Smith v. Kirk, 821 F2d 980 (4th Cir. 1987).
Some circuits have not reached this issue. Beechwood Restorative Care Ctr. v. Leeds, 317
F Supp. 2d 248, 280 n.23 (WD.N.Y. 2004) (commenting on the 2nd Circuit). At least for
now, some courts in the Sixth and Tenth Circuits have allowed enforcement of Title VI
disparate impact regulations post-Sandoval. See Robinson v. Kansas, 295 F3d 1183, 1187
(10th Cir. 2002)("Disparate impact claims may still be brought against state officials for
prospective injunctive relief through an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce section
602 regulations."); Johnson v. City of Detroit, 319 F Supp. 2d 756, 761 n.4 (E.D. Mich.
2004); Lucero v. Detroit Public Schools, 160 E Supp. 2d 767, 772-73 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
62. Espenshade and Chung do not explicitly claim that their results necessarily ex-
tend to selective institutions like the University of Michigan. However, given the way the
authors frame their results around the Michigan affirmative action cases, it is realistic to
expect that others may draw that inference.
63. See, e.g., Richard 0. Lempert et al., Response:Answers to Methodological Queries, 25
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 585, 594-95 (2000) (modeling the impact of ending affirmative ac-
tion at the University of Michigan Law School).
64. See, e.g., Expert Report of Kinley Larntz, Ph.D in Grutter v. Bollinger, reprinted at
5 MICH.J. RACE & L. 463, 466-67, 477-82 tbls. 7-18 (1999). Note that I am not endors-
ing Larntz's methodology or conclusions, which the Supreme Court ultimately rejected in
connection with the question of narrow tailoring, and I have been critical of the method-
ologically similar claims by Richard Sander regarding the role of affirmative action at the
University of Michigan Law School. See Chambers et al., supra note 13, at 1886; Richard
0. Lempert et al., Affirmative Action in American Law Schools: A Critical Response to Richard
Sander's "A Reply to Critics" 33, 45 n.89 (Feb. 2006), Univ. of Michigan Law School Olin
Center Working Paper No. 60, available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1061 &context=umichlwps.
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significant when viewed in context. CIR would have been highly moti-
vated to present evidence of unfairness toward APAs (either in court or to
the media), given that it would have yielded a large political payoff in
terms of racially triangulating APAs as the principal victims of affirmative
action.6"
Accordingly, if Michigan voters were to end affirmative action in
public institutions of higher learning, the resulting gains for APAs in
highly selective programs like the University of Michigan Law School
would be far, far more meager than Espenshade and Chung's finding that
APAs would receive four out of five spots taken away from African
Americans and Latinos. And this is ultimately a rather narrow approach to
assessing the costs and benefits of affirmative action for APAs.66 Aside from
the fact that some underrepresented APA groups (e.g., Filipinos, Southeast
Asians, Pacific Islanders) can directly benefit from affirmative action in
67higher education, overall APAs share in the compelling educational
benefits associated with a racially diverse student body (including at the
University of Michigan).68 In addition, affirmative action, and the larger
65. See Claire Jean Kim, The Racial Triangulation of Asian Americans, 27 PoL. & Soc'v
105, 122-23 (1999) (describing how the "racial triangulation" of APAs involves valorizing
Asian Americans relative to African Americans and that
when the two groups are juxtaposed not only in abstract comparisons but in
real-life conflicts, the ideological payoff is even greater... .This payoff is so
rich that conservatives have actually manufactured conflicts between Blacks
and Asian Americans in order to achieve it ... [Conservative affirmative ac-
tion opponents in the 1980s] shifted public debate from the real issue at
hand-whether or not several leading universities imposed racial quotas on
Asian American students to preserve the Whiteness of their student bodies-
to the false issue of whether affirmative action programs designed to benefit
Blacks and Latinos unfairly discriminated against Asian Americans.
See also sources quoted infra notes 51-52.
66. Dennis Hayashi & Christopher Edley, Jr., The Presidential Review of Affirmative
Action:A View from the Inside, 6 AsiAN AM. POL'Y REv. 33, 40 (1996), stating:
We believe that measuring the value of affirmative action solely by examin-
ing who benefits from a defined zero-sum game is short-sighted. Affirmative
action's value is tied not just to an individual job or educational slot, but to
the overall health and stability of a corporation, business, campus, or society
and to an acknowledgment that discrimination remains an ongoing problem.
67. An example is the selective University of Washington Law School, where prior
to Initiative 200 banning affirmative action, the Law School gave a plus factor to Filipino
applicants. Looking at the same period as in Table 1, the University of Washington Law
School enrolled an average of 5.7 Filipinos per year in 1993-98, compared to 2.1 in 1999-
2005.
68. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327-33; Patricia Gurin et al., Diversity in Higher
Education: Theory and Impact on Educational Outcomes, 72 HAnv. EDUC. REv. 330, 352, 354
tbl.3 (2002)(racial/ethnic diversity in the classroom had a positive effect on active thinking
and intellectual engagement for APAs at the University of Michigan); Dean K. Whitla et
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movement toward inclusion of which affirmative action is a part, help to
ensure fairness toward APAs in a variety of employment settings, such as
opening up "good ol' boy" hiring networks in police/fire departments
and contracting, and ensuring that stereotyping (unconscious or other-
wise) does not place "glass ceilings" on APAs seeking leadership positions
in government and corporate America.69
al., Educational Benefits of Diversity in Medical School: A Survey of Students, 78 ACAD. MED.
460, 463 fig. 1 (2003) (survey of medical students at Harvard and UC San Francisco, in-
cluding approximately 165 APAs, with 68% of APAs responding that having students of
different races and ethnicities was a "clearly positive" element of their educational experi-
ence).
69. See, e.g., Deborah Woo, GLASS CEILINGS AND ASIAN AMERICANS: THE NEw FACE
OF WORKPLACE BARRIERS (2000); Deborah J. Woo, Glass Ceilings: A Wake- Up Call for Asian
Americans?, in THE NEW FACE OF ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICA: NUMBERS, DIVERSITY AND
CHANGE IN THE 21ST CENTuRY 224 (Eric Lai & Dennis Arguelles eds., 2003); Paul M.
Igasaki, Discrimination in the Workplace:Asian Americans and the Debate Over Affirmative Action,
6 ASIAN Am. POL'Y REv. 15 (1996);Theodore Hsein Wang, Swallowing Bitterness:The Impact
of the California Civil Rights Initiative on Asian Pacific Americans, 95 ANN. SURVEY Am. L. 463
(1995); APALSA Symposium, Rethinking Racial Divides: Panel on Affirmative Action, 4 MICH.
J. RACE & L. 195, 233-34 (1998) (comments of professor Sumi Cho).
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